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Abstract
In response to an apparent decline in global food safety, numerous public and private
regulatory initiatives have emerged to restore public confidence. This trend has been
particularly marked by the growing influence of private regulators such as
multinational

food

companies,

supermarket

chains

and

non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), who employ private standards, certification protocols, thirdparty auditing, and transnational contracting practices. This paper explores how the
structure and processes of private food safety governance interact with traditional
public governance regimes, focusing on Global Good Agricultural Practices
(GlobalGAP) as a primary example of the former. Due to the inefficiency and
ineffectiveness of public regulation in the face of global problems, private governance
in food safety has gradually replaced states’ command-and-control regulation with
more flexible, market-oriented mechanisms. The paper concludes by emphasizing the
importance of constructive regime interaction instead of institutional boundary
building to global food safety governance. Public and private ordering must each play
a role as integral parts of a larger, dynamic and evolving governance complex.

Keywords: Food safety, Governance, Public-private regime interactions, International
trade
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I. INTRODUCTION
The exponential increase in food safety incidents across the globe in the past decades
have resulted in mushrooming regulatory initiatives, including new standards and
requirements from national governments, international organizations, and private
actors. Such regulatory initiatives, public as well as private, have emerged primarily
to address the rapidly decaying public trust in modern global food chains, complicated
by many factors including the globalization of economic activities, advancements in
food science and transportation technology, the multinationalization of the food
industry, and the advent of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Given the
significantly transformed production, transportation, and consumption of food, 1 recent
food safety incidents, with their intensified scope, severity, frequency, and impact,
have become extremely challenging to cope with.

A World Health Organization (WHO) report indicates that food safety problems
contribute to 1.5 billion cases of diarrhea in children and over three million premature
deaths annually, both in developed and developing countries. 2

For example,

approximately 1.8 million children die in developing countries yearly of foodborne
diseases caused by contaminated food and water. 3 The United States Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 48 million illnesses, 128,000
hospitalizations, and 3,000 deaths result from foodborne diseases each year in the
United States. 4 Despite the unprecedented numbers of food safety incidents, no
multilateral treaty exists to monitor or regulate global food safety, other than the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS

1

See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISK 2008: A GLOBAL RISK NETWORK REPORT,
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/globalrisk/report2008.pdf. Yasmine Motarjemi et al., Future Challenges
in Global Harmonization of Food Safety Legislation, 12(6) FOOD CONTROL 339, 340-41 (2001). Fritz
K. Käferstein et al., Foodborne Disease Control: A Transnational Challenge, 3(4) EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 503, 503-10 (1997), at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol3no4/kaferste.htm.
Fritz K. Käferstein & Mohammed Abdussalam, Food Safety in the 21st Century, 77(4) BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 347, 347-351 (1999).
2
World Health Organization [hereinafter WHO], Food Safety Programme, Food Safety: An Essential
Public Health Issue for the New Millennium, 9, WHO/SDE/PHE/FOS/99.4 (1999).
3
Office for the South East Asia Region, WHO, Health Situation in the South East Asia Region 19941997, SEA/HS/209 (1999), at 213-14, available at http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Health_
Situation_health_situation-94_97.pdf.
4
See CDC Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States, at http://cdc.gov/foodborneburden/201
1-foodborne-estimates.html.
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Agreement), 5 which lightly touches upon the side issues of harmonization and
scientification from an international-trade-law (facilitation of food trade) perspective.
In addition, as contaminated food outbreaks respect no national boundaries, unilateral
measures adopted by national governments, even with a certain level of
extraterritorial effects, fail to provide an effective or efficient approach to addressing
the global food safety problem.

In light of the regulatory lacuna in public regulatory space, private actors, especially
multinational

food

companies,

supermarket

chains

and

non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), are increasingly filling the gaps by employing private
standards, certification protocols, third-party auditing, and transnational contracting
practices.6 The emergence of private governance in the food safety arena has been
alongside the gradual decline of states’ traditional command-and-control regulation,
which is increasingly being replaced by more flexible, market-oriented mechanisms.7
Examples include Global Good Agricultural Practices (GlobalGAP) and the British
Retail Consortium (BRC) Global Standards, and Tesco’s Nature’s Choice. Although
private standards are, in theory, not mandatory for suppliers, many have a de facto
mandatory status, as a large part of buyers in global agri-food markets now require
their suppliers to meet such private requirements, which are usually stricter than their
public counterparts. In particular, reinforced by the participation of players with
5

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 59 (2000),
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
6
See e.g. JENNIFER CLAPP & DORIC FUCHS eds., CORPORATE POWER IN GLOBAL AGRIFOOD
GOVERNANCE (2009). Denise Prévost, Private Sector Food-Safety Standards and the SPS Agreement:
Challenges and Possibilities, 33 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New
Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54(4) UCLA L. REV. 913
(2007); Tetty Havinga, Private Regulation of Food Safety by Supermarkets, 28(4) LAW & POL’Y 515
(2006); Linda Fulponi, Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System: The Perspective of Major
Food Retailers in OECD Countries, 31(1) FOOD POL’Y 1 (2006); Spencer Henson, The Role of Public
and Private Standards in Regulating International Food Markets (IATRC Summer Symposium: Food
Regulation and Trade: Institutional Framework, Concepts of Analysis and Empirical Evidence, Bonn,
Germany, May 28-30, 2006 Working Paper).
7
See generally BRIDGET M. HUTTER, REGULATION AND RISK: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
ON THE RAILWAYS 9-10 (2001); Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing
Policy mixes for Environmental Protection, 21(1) LAW & POL’Y 49 (1999); Franco Furger,
Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: The Case of the Maritime Industry, 19(4) LAW &
POL’Y 445 (1997); Philip Eijlander, Possibilities and Constraints in the Use of Self-Regulation and CoRegulation in Legislative Policy: Experience in the Netherlands – Lessons to Be Learned for the EU?,
9(1) ELECTRONIC J. COMP. LAW (2005); Philipp Pattberg, Private Governance and the South: Lessons
from Global Forest Politics, 27(4) THIRD WORLD Q. 579 (2006); David Antony Detomasi, The
Multinational Corporation and Global Governance: Modelling Global Public Policy Networks, 71(3) J.
BUS.ETHICS 321(2007); John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate
Crime Control, 80(7) MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1466-83 (1982).
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enormous market power such as WalMart, Carrefour, and McDonald’s, private
ordering initiatives are able to “filter[] all the way back through processors, traders,
and down to the level of agricultural production.”8 These initiatives are a testament to
the increasing importance of private governance tools in the global regulatory space
of food safety.

Nevertheless, the proliferating private ordering initiatives at different levels with
different designs have given rise not only to concerns but also many interesting
theoretical and practical questions, for their important public health, international
trade, and development implications. As regulatory regimes in global administrative
space do not operate in isolation, it is crucial to understand how global food safety
governance is configured and reconfigured through complex regime interactions.
What strengths and weaknesses are associated with the private approach to food
safety regulation? Are public and private forms of governance in competition or do
they complement each other? What problems and opportunities are associated with
public-private or other forms of regulatory collaboration? Whose values, interests or
preferences tend to prevail when private-public institutions interact? What guiding
principles, if any, should inform such public-private collaboration?

This paper

therefore endeavors to explore the structure and processes of private food safety
governance and their interactions with the traditional public governance regimes so as
to shed light on such inquiries. Part II offers a brief account of the public approach to
food safety at the national and international level, pointing out its ineffectiveness and
inefficiency in face with this global problem. Part III describes the emergence of
private governance of food safety, its features and driving forces, as well as its merits
and problems. This paper focuses on GlobalGAP as the primary example. In Part IV,
I assess the regime interface between public and private governance sites. Part V
concludes by emphasizing the importance of constructive regime interaction instead
of institutional boundary building to global food safety governance. Private ordering
should not be categorically seen as destructive market barriers or regulatory
competition, but rather an integral part of a larger, dynamic and evolving governance
complex, which facilitates active, mutually reinforcing spheres of orchestrated global
food safety governance.

8

CLAPP & FUCHS, supra note 6, at 14.
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II. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOVERNANCE OF FOOD SAFETY

With ever-increasing food safety crises and heightened public criticism of
government failure, it is however remarkable that no multilateral legal instrument
addresses these global food safety issues in a comprehensive manner.9 Indeed, at the
international level, relevant public institutions such as the WTO, WHO, and Codex
Alimentarius Commission (Codex), face numerous difficulties and problems that
undermine their effectiveness and efficiency in addressing global food safety crises.

First, the WTO multilateral trading system, which arguably wields the most
significant influence on food safety issues, has never made food safety a core concern
throughout its history. 10

The WTO has no provisions regarding the effective

promotion of food safety beyond its set of trade agreements.11 Its most relevant legal
instrument, the SPS Agreement, does not require governments to take positive steps
to ensure food safety, but stands as a means for WTO members to create exceptions to
each another's food safety rules and standards, in effect, to facilitate food trade.12
Some scholars argue that many SPS Agreement provisions are designed in an
unbalanced manner at the expense of public health, and may further create
unnecessary barriers to WTO members whose measures genuinely aim at food safety
rather than protectionism.13

Second, the Codex, established by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
WHO in 1963, currently serves as the international body setting public food
standards, but the scientific basis of its standards has faced serious challenges, as has
the legitimacy of its substantive and procedural rules, the accountability of its
9

See Ching-Fu Lin, Global Food Safety: Exploring Key Elements for an International Regulatory
Strategy, 51(3) VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 637, 665 (2011).
10
Huei-chih Niu, A Comparative Perspective on the International Health Regulations and the World
Trade Organization'sAgreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 1 ASIAN
J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 513, 515 (2006).
11
Lin, supra note 9, at 665-69.
12 See Bruce A. Silverglade,
The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:
Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 517, 517-20 (2000).
13 See e.g. Alan O. Sykes,
Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A
Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 354, 368 (2002).
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structure and operations, and the transparency of its decision-making process.14 Due
to the SPS Agreement's reference to its standards as the international standards in the
food safety arena, Codex holds a legal status as a quasi-legislator whose standards are
de facto mandatory for WTO members.15 Most importantly, the Codex has become
increasingly politicized especially in contentious food safety issues, because Codex
member states have been incentivized by the backing of WTO dispute settlement
system to use Codex platform as a means to pursue their trade interests instead of
food safety. 16 As demonstrated by the controversial disputes over beef growth
hormones (BGH), genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and ractopamine meat
leaner, the Codex has numerous problems such as its frequent use of majority vote
rather than consensual decision, poor developing-country member participation, and
potential conflicts of interest over scientific authority.17 All of these problems have
rendered Codex unbalanced between public health and fair food trade practices, and
its current institutional design inadequate in producing good governance of global
food safety.

Thirdly, the WHO, the United Nation’s special agency mandated with global health
issues, including that of food safety, has so far failed to play a leading role in creating
or coordinating governance initiatives.18 In addition, as argued by many international
health law scholars, the WHO has failed to fully employ its normative authority
delegated in WHO Constitution Articles 19, 21 and 23,19 and in fact, it has refrained

14

See e.g. Elizabeth Smythe, In Whose Interests? Transparency and Accountability in the Global
Governance of Food: Agribusiness, the Codex Alimentarius, and the World Trade Organization, in
CORPORATE POWER IN GLOBAL AGRIFOOD GOVERNANCE 93 (Jennifer Clapp & Doris Fuchs eds.);
Ching-Fu Lin, Scientification of Politics and Politicization of Science: Reassessing the Limits of Codex
Alimentarius Commission (working paper, an earlier version of which was presented at the Conference
on the Future of Transnational Law: The EU, USA, China, and the BRICS, organized by European
Law Journal, Peking University School of Transnational Law, and College of Europe, 29 Nov-1 Dec
2012, Shenzhen, China).
15
Joel P. Trachtman, The World Trading System, the International Legal System and Multilevel
Choice, 12 EUR. L.J. 469, 480 (2006).
16
ALBERTO ALEMANNO, TRADE IN FOOD: REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES IN THE EC AND
THE WTO 262-63 (2007).
17
See generally Lin, supra note 14.
18
Lin, supra note 9, at 673-84.
19
See Allyn L. Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal Framework for
Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (1992); Lawrence O. Gostin,
Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World’s Least Healthy People: Toward a Framework of Global
Health, 96 GEO. L.J. 331, 334 (2008).375; and David P. Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemerging
Infectious Diseases: Challenges for International, National, and State Law, 31 INT’L LAWYER 773
(1997).
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from adopting any binding legal instruments on food safety for over 65 years. 20 It
remains unclear whether the WHO is politically and practically capable of
undertaking international food safety governance and facilitating or coordinating
regulatory efforts and future deliberations or cooperation on food safety issues.
Again, as collective international actions are needed to address food safety issues at
the global level, a comprehensive inter-governmental initiative has not yet found a
place on the agendas of the WTO, Codex, or WHO.

At the national level, however, many countries have addressed food safety concerns
by revamping food laws and restructuring their regulatory systems, such as enhancing
border inspection, and implementing import restrictions and integrated food chain
controls. Most such reforms are based on multiple public norms and institutions,
including legislation and regulation, international health standards or advisory
guidelines, and international trade treaty rules.

However, national food law regimes, especially those in developing countries, often
face numerous problems, such as insufficient infrastructure, inefficient jurisdictional
overlaps, ineffective law enforcement and inter-agency or central-local cooperation,
regulatory fragmentation, and lack of financial or technical capacity. 21 Moreover,
both developing and developed countries share such problems. Many industrialized
countries such as the United States and in Europe suffer from regulatory system
limitations, which further undermine public institutions’ ability to provide efficient
and effective food safety governance.22

20

In January 2010, the WHO Executive Board recommended that the World Health Assembly (WHA)
adopt a resolution "[r]ecognizing the importance of international agreement on global management of
food safety." However, in May 2010, the Sixty-Third WHA simply repeated the existing but ineffective
International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) mechanism. WHO, Advancing Food
Safety Initiatives, at 2, EB126.R7 (Jan. 21, 2010); Lin, supra note 9, at 678-81
21
See also Bernd van der Meulen, Development of Food Legislation Around the World: Concluding
Observations, in ENSURING GLOBAL GOOD SAFETY: EXPLORING GLOBAL HARMONIZATION 63, 65–66
(Christine E. Boisrobert et al. eds., 2010).
22
Lin, supra note 9, at 649-61. “In the United States, overlapping competencies among FDA, the
USDA, and other federal agencies have undermined the efficiency of the government in handling
routine food safety surveillance tasks and in responding to crises of foodborne hazards. Insufficient and
ineffective border inspection of imported food remains a node of weakness for both the United States
and the EU. In the EU, many inadequately outfitted new member states, although developing their
scientific and regulatory capacities, undermine the effectiveness of the high-standard European General
Food Law.”
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Against the background of globalized food production and consumption, problems
caused by the regulatory failure of one country can spill over to others and
considerably disturb their public health. A weak national ore regional public food
safety governance institution can have wide-reaching implications. Yet again, as
“[c]ontemporary food safety issues are of a globalized nature and pose global
challenges that transcend the competencies of individual states,” 23 unilateral national
laws and regulations alone are insufficient to effectively cope with food safety
problems in a highly interdependent world.24

III. THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE FOOD SAFETY GOVERNANCE

In light of the regulatory gaps left by the governments and inter-governmental
organizations, different forms of private governance have emerged and engage in the
regulation of global food market place. The most prominent example among various
private governance institutions is GlobalGAP, a (European-based) retailer-led
organization that sets Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) standards for agricultural
products beyond the traditional state-centric, command-and-control sanitary
regulations.

Many factors have stimulated and facilitated the development and institutionalization
of GlobalGAP and private food safety governance models as such. 25 First, the
significantly industrialized and globalized patterns of food production and
consumption have rendered food safety problems a regulatory issue beyond the scope
of traditional state-centric mentality. The intense economic globalization of the past
several decades has made national boundaries permeable to the flow of goods,
services, humans, investment, and information. 26 The rapid advancement of food
science and transportation technology, the advent of the WTO and its agreements
aimed at trade liberalization, and the growth of transnational agri-food corporations
have made global sourcing of food ingredients feasible and consequently have
23

Lin, supra note 9, at 661.
Id., at 650.
25
See e.g. Tetty Havinga, Transitions in Food Governance in Europe from National Towards EU and
Global Regulation and from Public Towards Hybrid and Private Forms of Governance, Nijmegen
Sociology of Law Working Papers Series 2012/02, 6-9, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189478.
26
Motarjemi et al., supra note 1, at 340-41; Käferstein et al., supra note 1, at 503-10.
24
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extended the global food supply chains. The rise of private food safety governance
schemes (e.g., GlobalGAP) can be, to a degree, attributed to the globalization of food
production and consumption. Global sourcing has also raised efficiency drivers (e.g.,
the reduction of transaction costs) of multinational food companies to effectively
manage and control their upstream suppliers in different countries via standardization,
certification, and third-party auditing methods.

Second, globalized food supply chains have intensified the seriousness, scale,
frequency, and impact of food scares in the past decades, which in turn have not only
heightened consumer concerns over food safety and distrust of government oversight,
but also forced governments as well as the industry to respond to public criticisms by
reviewing and reforming existing regulatory mechanisms. In the 2008 poisonous
milk powder case, melamine-contaminated dairy products from China—from infant
formula to crackers—affected 46 countries and caused more than 50,000 cases of
infant hospitalization and six reported deaths.27 This case triggered the recent reform
of food-safety regulations in China, including the new Food Safety Law of 2009 that
replaced China’s Food Hygiene Act.28 Another event of crucial importance in this
direction is the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, commonly known as mad
cow disease) outbreak, thought to have originated in the United Kingdom (UK) in the
1970s. Approximately 190,000 bovine cases of BSE were confirmed in 21 countries,
and more than 200 human cases were reported in 11 countries from 1986 to 2008.29

On the one hand, the BSE crisis (and of course, dreadful food safety scares in general)
has raised considerable waves of consumer concerns about food safety, which has
further amplified associated reputational costs (risks) on branded food suppliers,
especially those in the retail sector.30 This heightened consumer awareness prompted
by the BSE crisis spread from Europe across the globe, along with other food safety
issues (of varied risks) such as pesticides, and hormones and chemicals as animal
food additives, and GMOs.

This transformed mindset of consumers in Europe

incentivized private governance mechanisms like BRC and EurepGAP (GlobalGAP’s
27

See Lin, supra note 9, at 645-49 (2011).
Winston & Strawn, PRC Food Safety Law and Its Impacts on Chinese Food Industry, GREATER
CHINA LAW UPDATE (Dec., 2009), 1-2 (2009).
29
WHO Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Fact Sheet No. 113, WHO (Nov. 2002); Fact Sheet:
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Center for Disease Contrl & Prevention [CDC] (Aug. 23, 2010).
30
See Havinga, supra note 25, at 6-7.
28
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predecessor at the European level) to fill the regulatory gaps left by their public
counterparts. 31 Apart from reputational costs concerns, private actors along food
supply chains have increasingly engaged in games of product differentiation and
marketing strategies. More specifically, driven by a variety of consumer expectations
and preferences, private governance mechanisms now reach beyond safety and food
quality, to environmental protection, fair trade, labor rights, or animal welfare, etc.32

On the other hand, the BSE crisis has led to a public perception of the ineffectiveness
of state-centric regulatory systems and has triggered various regulatory reforms,
including the UK Food Safety Act 1990.33 Recognizing the limits of the traditional
command-and-control approach in global food supply chain era, a few reform projects
adopted by governments (especially in Europe) have gradually shifted the
responsibility for ensuring food safety from national governments to the food industry.
The UK Food Safety Act 1990 appears to be the benchmark legislation of “devolved
responsibility.”34 Section 21 of the Act imposes “due diligence” requirements on the
ultimate suppliers of branded food products, namely the retailers. Food suppliers bear
full responsibility for food safety incidents unless they can prove that they have taken
all reasonable precautions and have exercised all due diligence to prevent such
incidents. 35 This shift of responsibility from the public to private domain has
prompted in part the emergence and development of private governance vehicles
aimed at managing legal risks via private standards, certification protocols, and
transnational contracting practices.
Although regulatory reforms in the food safety domain are usually incident driven,36
the emergence of GlobalGAP and private governance mechanisms in general have not
been driven by a single incident or factor.

Rather, a mixture of factors—from

economic globalization, frequent food scares, consumer demands, to regulatory

31

Donal Casey, Three Puzzles of Private Governance: GlobalGAP and the Regulation of Food Safety
and Quality, UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No.
22/2009, at 10 (2009).
32
See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 525 (2004).
33
See generally Colin Scott, “Continuity and Change in British Food Law” 56 Modern Law Review
785, 792-94 (1990).
34
See Casey, supra note 31, at 7-10.
35
Section 21, UK Food Safety Act 1990.
36
Lin, supra note 9, at 683 (2011).
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reforms characterized by responsibility shifts, has stimulated the development and
institutionalization of private modes of food safety governance.

IV. INCREASED INTERACTIONS AT THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERFACES

The development and recent institutionalization of private regulatory mechanisms
illustrate “governance beyond the state,”37 which describes new modes of governance
designed and implemented by various non-state (private) actors. Food safety control
measures traditionally have been regarded as a regulatory space exclusively filled by
states, 38 with indirect participation by (the regulated) food companies. Now these
companies are setting and implementing private rules and standards, and overseeing
inspection and certification, which, individually and combined, may erode the
centrality enjoyed by state authorities.

Many observers argue that this rapid

evolvement reflects a paradigm shift from state-centric approach to a broader focus of
governance,39 as private governance is increasingly gaining influence in the global
market, and their authority and sanctions do not need to derive from national
governments.

Given the enormous market and economic power (e.g., through procurement
decisions) of multinational food companies involved in the private regulation, private
rules and standards, although not required by national or international law, have
arguably become de facto mandatory.40 Theoretically, private rules and standards are
not legally binding to suppliers—they are required to merely comply with the public
laws and regulations of their respective jurisdictions or export destinations. However,
as a practical matter, some private rules and standards have become the industry norm
along global food supply chains, which in effect present as “binding requirements”
when economic power asymmetry exists between the procurer and supplier. Because

37

See generally Colin Scott, Spontaneous Accountability, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS,
DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 174 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
38
39

See e.g. Casey, supra note 31, at10 (2009); more generally, see Gerry Stoker, Governance as
Theory: Five Propositions, 50 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 17 (1998).
40
See Gretchen H. Stanton, Food Safety-related Private Standards: The WTO Perspective, in PRIVATE
STANDARDS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 235, at 246
(2012).
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retail markets in most industrialized countries are highly integrated, the economic
power enjoyed by giant multinational corporations leaves little room for developing
country suppliers: they usually must either comply with the industry standards or exit
the market.41 It is therefore understandable why many producers and exporters in
developing countries fail to distinguish between private and governmental
requirements, as they only know that to sell their product in a developed country
market, they are required to comply with and inspected against certain rules and
standards.42

Public and private governance mechanisms, as a result, overlap as potentially
competing regulatory spheres at the transnational level. Such potential regulatory
competition is further amplified by the fact that the public-private interface is
increasingly blurred especially in the cross-border context, as exporting-country
suppliers are generally unaware of the nature, source or process of “law” in an
importing country as well as the so-called public-private divide. Such overlap and
blurred boundaries have raised concerns in interactions between public and private
sites of governance in the global food regulatory space, which is of crucial importance
but under-analyzed.43 There are some studies on private food standards, such as those
on GlobalGAP’s impacts or the WTO SPS Agreement’s provide possible responses to
private standards.44 However, such studies tend to observe private institutions (e.g.,
GlobalGAP) as well as public institutions (e.g., WTO) in isolation, and overlook the
theoretical and practical implications of studying how interactions take place between
the two. To fill this gap, this paper examines two important dimensions of interaction
between public and private regulatory mechanisms in global food safety governance:
(1) interactions between private ordering and national authorities (see Figs. 1 and 2,
the double arrows A); and (2) interactions between private ordering and relevant
international organizations (see Figs. 1 and 2, the double arrows B).

41

Difficulty especially for small suppliers in developing countries (cite)
(WTO, 10 December 2009) This is also why many developing WTO members are greatly concerned
with the trade effect projected by private standards, especially when they are usually stricter than their
public counterparts. Id.
43
The term “global food regulatory space” here falls in the concept of “global administrative space,” as
developed by Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
44
See e.g. Stanton, supra note 40; Denise Prevost, Private Sector Food-Safety Standards and the SPS
Agreement: Challenges and Possibilities, 33 SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 1 (2008).
42
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Figure 1: Public-Private Regime Interaction Triangle

While conventional wisdom gives the term “institution” broad definition that includes
both formal intergovernmental organizations and government agencies, and also
private actors and other hybrid bodies, it tends to focus more on the “public” side of
inter-institutional interactions.

For example, when approaching the “inter-

institutional relations” rubric, conventional wisdom captures as many as five
dimensions of institutional interaction that seem oriented to states of intergovernmental organizations: (1) Horizontal interactions between international actors;
(2) vertical interactions between an international organization and its member state(s);
(3) diagonal interactions between an international organization and non-member
state(s); (4) horizontal interactions between different agencies in various national
governments; and (5) horizontal relationships between government agencies in the
same country.45

However, a state-oriented perspective, which centers on the role of public
administrative institutions at national and international levels and their interactions,
seems incomplete, especially in the global food safety governance arena. To be sure,
public institutions enjoy considerable power and resources and therefore cannot be
ignored in mapping the regulatory complex as demonstrated in Figure 2. Yet today,
45

See Institute for International Law and Justice, Analyzing and Shaping Inter-Institutional Relations
in Global Governance (the report of a workshop held on April 16, 2012, at New York University
School of Law), at 1-2, available at http://www.iilj.org/newsandevents/documents/Aprilreport.pdf. See
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private regulators are actively changing the landscape originally controlled by public
institutions due to their economic stakes, expertise, resources, roles in global supply
chains, economic influence, and strategic business networking capacity. For that
reason, leaving out the “private” aspect of inter-institutional interactions in the
analysis of global food safety governance would result in an incomplete analysis.

Therefore, two dimensions of interaction between public and private institutions in
global food safety governance are of particular significance for two reasons. First, the
two dimensions here do not fall squarely into any of the five institutional-interaction
dimensions captured above; that is, they are not vertical, horizontal, or diagonal in a
strict sense.46 Rather, because private ordering is transnational in nature, and does not
fit directly into a fixed institutional level, 47 the inter-institutional relationships
between private and public regimes are in a contextual, informal, and crisscross
manner (see Figure 2).

Secondly, the “interaction” between public and private

spheres has so far been mainly driven (initiated) by the concerns raised in the public
spheres. In some circumstances, as a result, the patterns of such interaction are
inherently “one-way” or “hierarchical.”

46

It should be noted that there can be a vertical relationship between the private actor and the country
of its legal residence. However, this relationship is rather traditional and relatively well-studied in a
way that corporations are, as a matter of course, subject to national laws and regulations of a state that
has jurisdiction over them. Therefore, this paper does not focus on such aspect at present.
47
See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change, 30(4)
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING C: GOVERNMENT AND POLICY 571 (2012); Kenneth W. Abbott and
Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance:
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 501 (2009).
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Figure 2: Public-Private Regime Interaction in Global Food Safety Governance48

1. Interactions between Private Ordering and National Authorities

Given the ineffectiveness of public institutions in ensuring the safety of food products
along global supply chains, the private mode of governance stands out for its
adaptability, effectiveness, and transnational nature. This case illustrates this point.
In the absence of a multilateral or bilateral treaty on food safety regulation, country A,
the importing country, generally cannot extend its law enforcement (e.g., factory
inspections or microbiological tests) to producers located in country B, the exporting
country. Country A thus bears the cost of ensuring the safety of food products from
country B because the responsibility for spotting unsafe products normally rests on
border inspections of importing countries.49 Before food products actually arrive at
country A’s border inspection posts, country B is not required by law (international,
or country A’s or B’s laws) to inform country A of the exported products’ sanitary
condition.50 For example, in 2007, the Chinese authorities deliberately delayed the

48

Interactions between national authority and international organizations are mostly discussed in the
WTO and Codex platforms. See e.g. Lin, supra note 14.
49
See Ching-Fu Lin, SPS-Plus and Bilateral Treaty Network: A “Global” Solution to the Global FoodSafety Problem? 29 WIS. INT'L L.J. 694, at 716 (2012).
50
Even so, the United States inspects less than 2% of its total food imports. For example, as the United
States imports 80% of its annual seafood consumption from 13,000 foreign suppliers in about 160
nations, its health authorities inspect less than 2% of the imports. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
(GAO), GAO-04-246, FOOD SAFETY: FDA’S IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM SHOWS SOME PROGRESS,
BUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED (2004).
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visa-issuing process for officials of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)
who planned to inspect the factories that produced melamine-tainted pet food, so
when the FDA inspectors were at last permitted to visit the suspect factories, “one had
been bulldozed and the other chained, with its equipment removed.”51 “In both cases,
requests to view the shipment records of the firms in order to determine if other
melamine laced vegetable proteins had been exported to the US were denied on the
grounds that the records were in the possession of the local police and those files were
confidential.”52

In contrast, private modes of food safety governance possess important advantages in
regulating cross-border food safety practices. First of all, private actors (located in
country A or not) with considerable market power are able to proactively regulate the
behavior of suppliers in country B or other jurisdictions, across the entire supply
chain. Moreover, such private governance beyond national boundaries is further
reinforced by the concerned industry actors’ superior position in possessing scientific
and technical expertise in food and supply chain control, high stakes in preserving
brand names, and overall resources at their disposal. 53

Similarly, given their

enormous market power, private actors are usually able to create more effective and
efficient (at lower transaction costs) management, implementation, monitoring,
certification, and sanctions in a transnational context so as to structure how upstream
suppliers manufacture food products.54 Finally, as opposed to the difficult problems
with collective actions reflected in the negotiation, adoption, and modification of
multilateral international agreements,55 private governance has an important strength
in that it possesses flexibility, which enables its regulatory mechanisms to adapt to the
rapidly evolving area of food technology.56

51

See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, FOOD FROM CHINA: CAN WE IMPORT SAFELY?
7, n.10 (Oct. 4, 2007)
52
Id.
53
See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 6.
54
See generally Detomasi, supra note 7.
55
See Lin, supra note 9, at 730-31.
56
For example, genetically modified crops, cloned meat products, and many other novel foods are
usually beyond the traditional expertise of the government agencies, even those with health and safety
mandates. Transnational food corporations and industry associations, on the other hand, usually
possess their own laboratories, teams of expert scientists, and specialized knowledge and information
in food technology, which public institutions may lack.
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It is against such a background that an increasing number of states have encouraged
the involvement of private actors in food safety regulatory processes (albeit in a
hierarchical way). For example, the U.S. Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA)57
signed into law in 2011 emphasizes the need for the FDA to revamp its food safety
regulatory mechanism by partnering with private entities. Of particular significance
is the requirement that importers mandate their overseas suppliers to meet U.S. food
safety rules and standards. 58 Title III of FSMA, rather than focusing on a small
number of border inspections, FSMA requires the FDA to rely on third-party
resources to regulate food imports, including “third-party (usually private) auditors”
who inspect and certify that certain foreign suppliers have met U.S. food safety
requirements (the “Foreign Supplier Verification Programs”).59 The FSMA-mandated
Foreign Supplier Verification Programs may seem innovative to the public institution
(FDA), but they basically embrace the regulatory approach that GlobalGAP and
private institutions have utilized for over a decade. The FSMA can also be seen as a
public-private regime interaction initiated by the government, where the public
institution views private modes of governance as a complementation. Such design is
also evidenced in the design of EU General Food Law.60 The general principles of
the EU General Food Law declare that the primary responsibility for ensuring food
safety rests with the food industry. 61 European retailers and supermarkets have in
turn required private food certifications of their suppliers in non-EU countries to
ensure food safety. Such regulatory designs in some ways regards private modes of
governance as complementary, and shift at least part of the responsibility for ensuring
food safety from public institutions (national agencies) to private institutions (the food
industry). This complementary public-private interaction has again reinforced the
development and institutionalization of private governance instruments.62
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Food Safety Modernization Act [hereinafter FSMA], Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
See FSMA Title III.
59
FSMA Title III, Sec. 301. The FSMA also requires that importers verify that their foreign suppliers
have implemented proper preventive mechanisms. Id.
60
Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of 29 Jan. 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 31/1), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:031:0001:0024:EN:PDF [hereinafter EU General Food
Law].
61
Id.
62
This however makes some (consumer) NGOs raise concerns that private modes of governance will
undermine efforts to induce governments to regulate, or detract from the credibility and reliability of
having a “public” inspection or process to ensure compliance.
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However, for many developing countries, private ordering has caused unnecessary
problems for it competes with public rules and standards in many ways. First, due to
the technical and administrative complexity associated with private regulatory
schemes, which provide detailed requirements for every stage of the production and
processing chain (“down to the level of each individual producer or processing
plant”),63 the costs of compliance may be high and consequently, some developing
country suppliers (especially small ones) may be unable to afford them.64 Secondly,
developing countries often complain that many private standards seem to exceed
relevant government requirements, such as maximal levels of pesticide residues of
50% or even 33% of public standards established by the importing countries, or much
more stringent and complicated animal disease control steps. 65

Thirdly, the

proliferation of private food safety schemes has translated into possibly overlapping
and even conflicting public and private requirements,66 which unnecessarily increase
the costs of compliance, especially for small producers.

Conflict of laws

methodologies that have been developed to resolve inconsistent rules shed little light
on this issue, because the situation does not concern a horizontal inter-institutional
relationship. Even when a vertical inter-institutional relationship exists, the impacts
of private ordering do not appear to readily trigger public intervention, as they are
normal commercial practices, namely, business agreements among voluntary parties
in a free market space.

As a result, since such demanding private food safety standards have emerged from
developed countries and have considerably affected developing countries’ exports,
some developing countries have criticized private food safety standards as new (de
facto) sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) market barriers that undermine their trade
(export opportunities) and rights to development. 67

On the one hand, a few

developing countries have come to recognize the dominance of private ordering in
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Implications for Developing Countries, in PRIVATE STANDARDS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153, at 153-54 (2012).
64

18

global food supply chains as a market reality and have responded by cooperating with
private regulatory schemes.

For example, Kenya, Chile, India, Malaysia, and

Mexico 68 have developed government-led Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) and
certification services at very low or no cost to assist small suppliers, and they have
benchmarked such public certification services against private standards (e.g., so as to
be recognized as equivalent to GlobalGAP—this is NOT hierarchical).

On the other hand, some developing countries have brought the issue of private
standards up to the inter-governmental international level. Developing countries have
used such international platforms to challenge private ordering and have requested
that food regulation stay within public control or, at the very least, that private
ordering be disciplined by principles set by public institutions (hierarchical). For
example, in 2005, a delegate of St. Vincent and the Grenadines brought a complaint in
the WTO SPS Committee about GlobalGAP requirements that restricted the country’s
ability to export bananas to the EU.69 By raising its concern about GlobalGAP and
other private entities in general at the WTO, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
triggered heated debate at the international level with countries divided on the issue.70
Similar contested discussions also took place in other inter-governmental international
organizations, including inter alia the Codex, the World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).

2. Interactions between Private Ordering and International Organizations

As noted, private standards were first brought to the WTO SPS Committee in 2005 by
St Vincent and the Grenadines, which complained that the rules and standards of
EurepGAP are more stringent than international standards and government
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Olga van der Valk & Joop can der Roest, National Benchmarking Against GlobalGAP: Case Studies
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http://edepot.wur.nl/11453.
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WTO: News Items (June 29-30, 2005), at
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requirements, and argued that public rules should apply.71 The position of St Vincent
and the Grenadines was supported by Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina.
Because the issue of private standards has since then been raised frequently as a
specific trade concern at the SPS Committee, the SPS Committee jointly established a
workshop on private and commercial standards with the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) Trade & Sustainable Development, International Trade
Division in June 2007. The joint workshop reviewed different private standards
schemes, conducted case studies on many developing countries, and discussed the
implications of private standards in terms of market access, development issues, and
WTO rules.72

In the SPS Committee meeting on April 2–3, 2008, WTO members and the OIE
focused largely on the interface between private and public standards. First, the
Director-General of OIE warned that standards set by GlobalGAP or other private
actors may undermine the science-based and democratically adopted standards of
public international organizations and may therefore pose difficulties for developing
countries. 73 Moreover, OIE’s submission to the SPS Committee, emphasized that
private ordering has not been examined against the SPS Agreement, and “there is
reason to believe that many private standards are not consistent with SPS
obligations.” 74 As the OIE was seriously concerned about the potential traderestricting and -distorting effects of private standards, it proposed that the SPS
Committee act as a forum for countries to identify and discuss specific problems with
private ordering.75
In the SPS Committee, Uruguay and Egypt headed a group comprised of developing
countries which argued that private rules and standards are “arbitrary and can be
difficult for developing countries to meet.” WTO Members are obliged under the
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SPS Agreement to discipline their non-governmental bodies to respect SPS rules.76
They in particular based the arguments upon Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, which
reads, in part:
Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available
to them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their
territories, as well as regional bodies in which relevant entities
within their territories are members, comply with the relevant
provisions of this Agreement. In addition, Members shall not take
measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring
or encouraging such regional or non-governmental entities, or local
governmental bodies, to act in a manner inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement.77

Others rebutted this argument claiming that the “non-governmental entities” in Article
13 cannot be interpreted to include GlobalGAP and private-sector standard-setters
alike, as at the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, there was no such
phenomenon of private ordering and the drafters of the SPS Agreement were not
aware of this dramatic development and the institutionalization of private governance.
It is therefore argued that governments have no obligation to ensure the compliance of
private actors and their contractual commercial terms and conditions with the SPS
Agreement.78
On May 29, 2009, the 76th General Session of OIE International Committee adopted a
resolution on the implications of private standards in international trade of animals
and animal products.79 The resolution asked the Director General of the OIE “to work
with relevant public and private international organisations with the objective that
concerns of Members are taken into consideration and that private standards, where
used, are consistent with and do not conflict with those of the OIE [emphasis
WTO, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Members Set to Agree on Regionalization, Improved
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WTO:
News
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(April
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2008),
at
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added].”80 In the same year, the 32nd session of the Codex meeting discussed a report
on private food standards prepared by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
consultants, which systematically compared different types of private standards
against the presumption that they pose challenges to the Codex.81 The 2009 Codex
Report suggested that Codex include private standard bodies as observers to Codex
meetings, and reform Codex procedures to better respond to the various challenges of
private standards. However, many developing countries rejected the 2009 Codex
Report findings and insisted that Codex stand as “the sole international reference
organization for food safety.”82 During the 33rd session of the 2010 Codex meeting,
another report was considered that highlighted many developing countries’ concerns,
one being that private standards may undermine the Codex’s authority and other
official requirements, that third-party certification is technically and financially
difficult, that private standard-setting process generally lacks a sound scientific basis
and transparency, and that private standards have negative impacts on market access
and development. 83 The 2010 Report nevertheless favored the stance that Codex
standards, given they are scientifically backed and democratically adopted, should be
the “benchmarks” for their private counterparts.
In the same year, the OIE organized a meeting with global private standard-setting
bodies, including GlobalGAP and Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). OIE meeting
attendees agreed that “the basis for private standards on sanitary safety are the
existing international standards of OIE and Codex Alimentarius, as well as national
and regional legislation,” and that future collaboration between OIE, GlobalGAP, and
GFSI should be encouraged.84 Subsequently, in May 2010 the 78th General Session
of the OIE International Committee passed another resolution that requested the OIE
“maintain and strengthen appropriate links and dialogue with relevant global private
standard setting bodies and global private industry organisations with the aim to allow
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compatibility of private standards with OIE standards.”85 Most importantly, toward
this objective, in another meeting, the OIE followed up with selected private ordering
bodies with a global reach and explored the possibility of signing official agreements
with GlobalGAP and GFSI. The OIE concluded an official agreement with GFSI, as
it is more of a benchmarking institution than a standard-setting institution. 86
However, because GlobalGAP is a standard-setting body and potentially competes
with the OIE, the OIE decided not to enter into any official agreement with
GlobalGAP at that time, but rather to merely continue to share information under an
exchange-of-letters mechanism.87

V. GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY GOVERNANCE THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE REGIME
INTERACTIONS

As a matter of fact, GlobalGAP and other private sector regulators, will continue to
expand the range and variety of rules and standards to cover not only food safety
standards, but also standards for sustainability, labor rights, and animal welfare. 88
However, the interactions between public and private institutions to date have been
limited. Reactions at the national level have been polarized based upon nation states’
respective interests and concerns—from trade and development to health protection.
In the WTO context, although Article 13 of the SPS Agreement leaves some room
(albeit little) for the argument of disciplining private standards against international
trade rules,89 it remains unclear if and if so, to what extent should WTO Members be
required to “take such reasonable measures as may be available” to manage the
dynamics of public-private interactions in the food safety arena. Indeed, as the inter85
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institutional relationship between private ordering represented by GlobalGAP and
international public institutions is neither horizontal nor vertical in the traditional
sense, then public institutions’ use of legal interpretation as a means to claim
supremacy over or eliminate overlaps with private institutions seems to be of very
limited utility. Furthermore, as in the Codex and OIE contexts, attempts to create and
define boundaries between public and private institutions based on the concepts of
competence, expertise, or legal mandate, may not work in such unconventional interinstitutional relationships.

The perspective of the public institutions discussed here is rather one-way,
hierarchical, and state-centric, as we can clearly see in the Codex 2010 Report, which
underlines the “benchmark” superiority of Codex, as well as the OIE Resolutions,
which treat GlobalGAP from the perspective of competition rather than of
cooperation. As it seems unrealistic to try to contain and isolate private food safety
governance sites or ignore their influence in the global market, a constructive
framework for public-private regime interactions is desirable.

Therefore, after

showing the dynamic development and shifts of public-private institutional interplay
over time, I conclude by presenting some preliminary ideas for further discourse
toward a shared vision of the respective roles of private and public institutions in the
broader architecture of global food safety governance.

First, given the interactive nature of global food safety governance, institutions have
become less important as regulators executing their mandates and exercising their
authority, but more important as platforms for inter-institutional interactions.
Although the legitimacy, transparency, and accountability of private ordering
institutions remain issues of much debate, the current approaches adopted by relevant
public institutions seem to ignore the interactive nature of global governance. Public
institutions such as the WTO, Codex, and OIE, and many state governments aim to
reinforce boundaries among individual institutions and protect the supremacy of
public rules and standards despite the regulatory advantages of private ordering.

Second, the current discourse excessively centers upon the trade and development
implications of private ordering, while overlooking its potential contribution to food
safety regulation and public health in general. Observing the issue merely from a
24

trade and development perspective may lead to an incomplete conclusion on the costs
and benefits of the various models of governance. While high costs of compliance
and barriers to export market have been cited as developing countries’ main concerns,
some research shows that meeting private standards does not necessarily harm
developing countries but in some cases benefits them economically.90 For example,
private rules and standards may reduce transaction cost, enhance quality and price
premiums, increase competitiveness and enhance market access. 91

While the

empirical evidence on how private rules and standards affect developing countries is
limited and the debates remain,92 and although the public health benefits of private
ordering has not been well considered, it is too early for relevant public institutions to
“eliminate potential competitors” before seeking inter-institutional conversation and
collaboration.

Third, public-private inter-institutional interactions are constructive to global food
safety governance. As no meta-framework exists or appears to be emerging that
dictates, coordinates, or pioneers the development of such diverse norms, the public
as well as private institutions together constitute an evolving governance complex
being formed and transformed, configured and reconfigured by different actors at
different levels with different experimental approaches. 93

Public-private inter-

institutional interactions in the process can serve as a vehicle for constructivist
learning, mimesis, experimentation, and innovation, projecting normative effects on
participating governance sites. The fact that GlobalGAP spurs regulatory reforms (or
revisions of existing law) in many countries (both developing and developed), that the
OIE takes a step toward legal innovation by signing an official cooperation agreement
with a NGO,94 and that the Codex reassess its decision-making process against the
90

WTO, supra note 76. There are currently two sides of valid arguments over the effects, both positive
and negative, of private food safety standards. See Liesbeth Colen, Miet Maertens and Johan Swinnen,
Private Standards, Trade and Poverty: GlobalGAP and Horticultural Employment in Senegal, 35(8)
THE WORLD ECONOMY 1073 (2012).
91
Steven M. Jaffee and Spencer Henson, Agro-food Exports from Developing Countries: The
Challenges Posed by Standards, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(A.M. AKSOY AND J.C. BEGHIN EDS.) 91 (2005).
92
Thomas Herzfeld, Larissa S. Drescher, and Carola Grebitus, Cross-National Adoption of Private
Food Quality Standards, 36(3) FOOD POLICY 401 (2011).
93
Ching-Fu Lin, Reassessing the Codex Alimentarius Commission: An Analysis of the Ractopamine
Hydrochloride Dispute, Paper to the Future of Transnational Law: The EU, USA, China, and the
BRICS (2012 WISH Conference), Shenzhen, China (2012).
94
IGO’s signing official agreements with NGOs in the food safety arena is a legal innovation through
inter-institutional relations, although in some other areas (such as essential medicine development)

25

arguably more effective private standard-setters95 all well demonstrate constructive
regime interactions. Dynamic inter-institutional interactions in the food safety area
can also help build scientific networks, activity coordination, information exchange,
joint projects, and expert collaboration, which are mutually reinforcing in
strengthening global food safety governance.

Finally, polycentric governance may call for a new understanding of legitimacy.
Some may argue that private governance models suffer from a legitimacy deficit,
primarily due to private regulators’ narrow pursuit of corporate profits rather than
public goods,96 and their lack of electoral mandate or democratic representativeness
as enjoyed by public institutions. 97 Such a myriad of legitimacy deficit limits the
roles of private governance and therefore, as noted by the World Bank, public
standards and approaches would seem to remain indispensable.98 Yet in many aspects
such as supply chain expertise, participation, accountability, responsiveness,
adaptability, and transparency, private institutions often perform better than the multilevel, bureaucratic public institutions—so whether Codex enjoys more legitimacy
over GlobalGAP is a point of debate. 99 While the idea of global food safety
governance confers no supremacy to either public or private institutions, their
legitimacy derives from the extent to which their institutional design embeds social
(economic, public health, and other) norms in the global marketplace, norms “that
derive authority directly from interested audiences, including those they seek to
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regulate, not from sovereign states.” 100 As the new models of global food safety
governance increasingly “derive their legitimacy from the voluntary and conditional
participation of individuals who can revoke their consent at any time,” 101 the
understanding of legitimacy of global governance needs to be reconceptualized.
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